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Jurisdictions and causes of action: Commercial 
considerations in dealing with bullying, stress and 
harassment cases—Part II 
  Niall Neligan B.L.*   
In the concluding part of this two part article, the author will 
examine how the courts have developed rules for dealing with 
tortious claims for psychiatric injuries arising out of bullying, stress 
and harassment cases. The article will examine whether it is 
desirable to consolidate and codify employment rights law in order 
to provide clarity to prospective litigants. Finally, the author will 
argue that if codification is required, then this will necessitate a 
change in the nature of present jurisdictions for bringing claims 
involving bullying, stress and harassment in the workplace. 
Tortious claims for psychiatric injuries arising from 
bullying and stress cases 
Having established that potential litigants in cases involving 
bullying, stress and harassment can pursue claims under a variety of 
headings, it is now necessary to consider what impact bullying and 
harassment in the workplace is having on the emerging tort of stress-
induced psychiatric injuries. The law on personal injuries in the 
workplace is well settled; however, in the last 10 years there has 
been a dramatic increase in the number of bullying and stress-
induced claims coming before the courts. Whereas considerable 
jurisprudence existed for dealing with cases involving physical 
injuries and indeed, cases for nervous shock,1 the courts were, for a 
long time, reluctant to allow claims for work-induced stress injuries 
to succeed. Quite often, cases which were brought failed to satisfy 
the test of foreseeability which applies to actions brought under the 
tort of negligence. 
However, since the case of Walker v Northumberland County 
Council [1995] 1 All E.R. 727 , it has been accepted that the 
common law principles of liability can apply to stress-induced 
injuries.2 The principle enunciated in the Walker decision has 
evolved and now applies to a variety of situations, including cases 
where the stress-induced injury has been brought on by incidences of 
bullying and harassment. A major problem encountered by the UK 
courts in the aftermath of the Walker decision was to determine the 
precise parameters of the duty concerned. Indeed, the Walker 
decision had the potential to open the floodgates to a myriad of 
fictitious or exaggerated claims reinforcing the view, in the UK 
press at least, of a compensation culture at work.3 In reality, liability 
for psychiatric injury caused by stress at work was no different from 
liability for physical injury; the courts merely had to refine the 
existing principles. 
The opportunity to do so arose in Sutherland v Hatton ,4 which gave 
the Court of Appeal a chance to review the law and refine the 
principles of negligence and duty of care owed by an employer to an 
employee5 . 
In Hatton , the Court of Appeal established 16 principles which need 
to be considered in a case involving work-induced stress.6 The 
principles were summarised by Smith & Wood in their text on 
Employment Law.7 
〇. (a)  existing principles of employer's liability can apply to work-
induced stress injuries— namely whether the injury was 
foreseeable on the part of the employer; 
. (b)  mental injuries by their very nature are more difficult to 
foresee than physical injuries, therefore an employer is entitled 
to assume that an employee can withstand the normal 
pressures of work; 
. (c)  there are no inherently dangerous jobs in relation to stress and 
so much will depend on whether the demands on the employee 
were excessive—was there evidence of prior sickness; did the 
employee, or indeed, other employees complain about 
stress? 
. (d)  whether or not the employer enquired from the employee if he 
or she was able to cope with the strains of the job—an 
employer is entitled to take at face value what the employee 
tells him; 
. (e)  a breach of duty will only take place if the employer has failed 
to take steps which he reasonably could have been expected to 
take—which will inevitably boil down to whether the 
employer had the necessary resources at his disposal; 
. (f)  employers who provide an operative and confidential 
counseling service are unlikely to be found in breach of 
duty; 
. (g)  if the only way to avoid exposure to a breach and thus injury 
to the employee is to dismiss, demote or reassign the 
employee, the employer will not be in breach if the employee 
demonstrates a willingness to continue working in that job; 
. (h)  there must be a causal connection between the breach of duty 
and the stress-induced injury sustained; and 
. (i)  where the employer was only partly responsible (namely there 
were other extraneous causal factors) then the employer will 
only be liable for his part and the court must apportion the 
blame when awarding damages. Finally, in Hatton the Court 
took the view that there was an onus on the plaintiff to inform 
his employer of the effect on his health.8 This may be practical 
in some instances but where the immediate supervisor is the 
person to whom the complaint is made, problems may arise. 
The Hatton principles provide a framework whereby one employer 
will be held responsible, while a more conscientious employer will 
at least be afforded a valid defence, in so far that he could not have 
foreseen, or if he did, at least tried to minimise the impact on the 
employee.9 Furthermore, where the employer offers a confidential 
advice service, with referral to appropriate counseling or treatment 
services, he may depending on the circumstances, escape liability. 
While this may be good in theory and practical for large employers 
who have the resources to provide such a service, it will provide 
little solace for a small to medium-size employer who may not be in 
a position, for financial reasons or otherwise, to provide counseling 
to their employers. Moreover, even the provision of such a service 
may not be enough. 
The Hatton principles, while helpful, place a very high burden on 
the employee, and unsurprisingly, the House of Lords has lowered 
the threshold in circumstances where the employee did not 
specifically bring it to the employers attention. In the case of Barber 
v Somerset County Council ,10 Lord Walker found liability was 
established from a three week sick cert which referred to stress and 
depression and which, he said, should have led to enquiries by 
management about the plaintiff's problems and an attempt to 
alleviate them: 
“[An] employer is generally entitled to take what he is told by his 
employee at face value, unless he has good reason to think to the 
contrary. He does not generally have to make searching enquiries of 
the employee or seek permission to make further enquiries of his 
medical advisers.”11 
The court took the view that the prudent employer, once he was 
aware that an employee took time of work due to workload-induced 
stress, should have investigated the situation to assess how the 
difficulties might have been improved. 
It is important to note that in relation to the duty of care owed, the 
employer does not guarantee that an employee will not be injured; 
the employer only undertakes to take reasonable care, and 
consequently will only be liable if there is a lack of care on his part 
in failing to prevent an occurrence which was reasonably 
foreseeable. This of course places a corresponding duty on the 
employee to look after himself, and not to blame the employer for 
every incident which occurs or for his own misfortunes. 
The Hatton decision must be interpreted in light of developments 
where the stress-induced injury is attributed to bullying and 
harassment, as can be seen in the case of Majrowski v Guy's and St 
Thomas's NHS Trust .12 In the Majrowski case, the plaintiff would 
have been statute-barred if his case had been one involving a 
physical injury. Moreover, it is likely that he would have failed the 
foreseeability test in Hatton . As noted above, Majrowski brought an 
action under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and 
succeeded in his argument that the defendants were vicariously 
liable—because vicarious liability involved strict liability there was 
no requirement for foreseeability.13 Additionally, the court allowed 
the plaintiff to claim damages for anxiety as opposed to mental 
injury which was the bedrock of the Hatton decision. Finally, the 
action taken in Majrowski was an alternative to a discrimination-
based case, where an employer would have a defence based on 
taking all reasonable steps to prevent discriminatory behaviour.14 As 
such, there was no defence available to the employer within the 
meaning of the Prevention of Harassment Act 1997 
 
Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 
The principles of breach of duty arising under the law of tort must 
also be examined in light of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work 
Act 2005 , in particular s.8, which sets out the general duties of an 
employer: 
. “8.—(1)  Every employer shall ensure, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, the safety, health and welfare at work of his or her 
employees. 
. (2)  Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) , the 
employer's duty extends, in particular, to the following: 
. (a)  managing and conducting work activities in such a way 
as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the 
safety, health and welfare at work of his or her 
employees; 
. (b)  managing and conducting work activities in such a way 
as to prevent, so far as is reasonably practicable, any 
improper conduct or behaviour likely to put the safety, 
health or welfare at work of his or her employees at 
risk; 
.  
. …” 
Section 8(1)(b) has a very broad application, providing a 
complainant with a cause of action in bullying cases arising out of a 
breach of statutory duty. This applies where the employer has 
neglected to manage his workplace in such a way so as to prevent 
improper conduct or behaviour, and which is therefore likely to put 
the safety, health and welfare of his or her employees at risk. 
The parameters of this provision have yet to be fully tested, although 
the relevance on health and safety legislation was considered in one 
of the most important cases to come before the courts: McGrath v 
Trintech Technologies Limited and Trintech Group plc , which is 
considered below.15 In the same year, Lavan J. in the High Court 
expressly referred to health and safety law in the case of Quigley v 
Complex Tooling and Moulding. 16 
 
Tortious and contractual claims for psychiatric injuries 
arising under Irish law 
The law in Ireland has been re-evaluated in light of the Hatton 
decision, which has provided some guidance to the courts in dealing 
with cases involving bullying and stress-induced injury claims. 
However, before considering court decisions, it is necessary to 
consider the nature of the jurisdiction for dealing with such cases. 
There are several question marks over the nature of the jurisdiction 
for bringing stress-induced injury claims; the waters having been 
somewhat muddied by the introduction of the Personal Injuries 
Assessment Board. The present view would seem to suggest that 
such claims should go before the board for consideration, however, 
in the absence of any reference to assessment in the book of 
quantum and moreover the absence of sufficient case law, it is likely 
(though it cannot be taken for granted) that the board will authorise 
claimants to issue civil proceedings. 
After the Walker decision the Irish courts demonstrated a 
willingness to consider such claims. As such the law must be divided 
between pre-and post- Hatton decisions. 
 
Pre-Hatton decisions 
In Sullivan v Southern Health Board , the Supreme Court upheld a 
High Court award of £15,000 in damages to a doctor “for the stress 
and anxiety caused to him in both his professional and domestic life 
by the persistent failure of the Board to remedy his legitimate 
complaints”.17 Similarly, in McGrath v Minister for Justice and the 
Attorney General , Mr McGrath, a member of An Garda Síochána 
was awarded compensation by Morris J., which included 
compensation of £40,000 for the stress, anxiety and general 
disruption to his enjoyment of life.18 This stress occurred following 
his suspension on grounds of criminal embezzlement, of which he 
was found not guilty, because the suspension continued for a time 
period which was longer than that within which it would have been 
reasonably practicable to have held a full hearing into the 
suspension. 
In Curran v Cadbury (Ireland) , a case involving nervous shock, the 
plaintiff claimed she suffered a psychiatric illness having been 
involved in a workplace accident when she turned on a conveyor 
machine unaware of the presence of a fitter who was servicing the 
equipment at the time. McMahon J. in the Circuit Court 
acknowledged the existence of the broad common law duty: 
“The duty of the employer towards his employee is not confined to 
protecting the employee from physical injury only; it also extends to 
protecting the employee from non-physical injury such as 
psychiatric illness or the mental illness that might result from 
negligence or from harassment or bullying in the workplace.”19 
With particular reference to the decision in Walker , the judge went 
on to state: 
“The English Courts imposed liability where the plaintiff 
foreseeably suffered a nervous breakdown because of unreasonably 
stressful working conditions imposed on him by his employer. There 
is no reason to suspect that our Courts would not follow this line of 
authority if it came before the Courts in this jurisdiction.” 
Two years later in the case of McHugh v The Minister for Defence & 
Others , Budd J. in the High Court awarded compensation for 
negligence and breach of duty to a soldier who suffered post-
traumatic stress disorder.20 In particular, the court made it clear that 
the defendants were under a duty to take reasonable care for the 
health and safety of their employees and to keep abreast of 
contemporary knowledge in the area of those afflictions to which 
soldiers were inevitably exposed in the course of duty. Furthermore, 
the defendants had negligently failed to take appropriate care for the 
health of the plaintiff, in so far that they had failed to observe the 
obvious manifestations of post-traumatic stress disorder, or else had 
failed to recognise the significance of the symptoms, and had 
negligently failed to obtain remedial therapy for the plaintiff. 
In O'Byrne v Dunnes Stores ,21 the plaintiff was awarded damages 
arising out of a breach of contract where the plaintiff was forced to 
move location without any notice or opportunity to make 
representations. The court held that the defendant must have 
contemplated that the plaintiff would suffer mental distress from this 
particular breach of his contract. It was also noted that the plaintiff 
had been subjected to an incident of bullying which the court 
described as “inexcusably offensive” and “reprehensible”. The judge 
went on to criticise the defendant for failing to apologise for its 
behaviour towards the plaintiff, who had rendered 25 years service 
to the company and who was entitled to be treated in a civilised 
manner. 
 
 
The impact of Hatton on Irish case decisions 
Although the courts in this jurisdiction were prepared to consider 
stress-induced injuries, like their UK counterparts before Hatton 
there was an absence of guidelines from the superior courts 
concerning the circumstances in which a claim would be entertained. 
In McGrath v Trintech , Laffoy J. in the High Court considered the 
importance of establishing foreseeability in cases for stress-induced 
injuries at work.22 In McGrath , the plaintiff did not succeed in his 
action for damages, the court holding: 
“[that]…the plaintiff has not crossed the foreseeability threshold. 
The risk of psychological harm to the plaintiff was not reasonably 
foreseeable; The fundamental test is whether the defendant fell 
below the standard to be properly expected of a reasonable and 
prudent employer. In my view it did not. Having done what was 
reasonable in the circumstances, the defendant did not breach its 
duty of care and has no liability to the plaintiff either in contract or 
in tort.” 
The court recognised that the plaintiff did suffer from a recognisable 
form of psychiatric illness, noting that there is a statutory duty on the 
employer to protect the psychiatric health of employees. However, 
the plaintiff failed to establish a breach of statutory duty on the part 
of the defendant in consequence of which the plaintiff suffered 
stress-induced injury. 
Not long after the decision in McGrath , Lavin J. in the High Court 
considered the question of foreseeability in Quigley . The plaintiff 
had previously brought a successful claim against his employer in 
which the Employment Appeals Tribunal (“EAT”) ordered his re-
engagement; he subsequently initiated proceedings claiming 
damages for personal injuries as a result of harassment, bullying, 
humiliation and victimisation by the Plant Manager and Managing 
Director of the defendant company. Lavin J. noted that the plaintiff 
had made several complaints to his employer about being bullied 
and noted that nothing was done to prevent it re-occurring. Lavin J. 
followed the test laid down by Laffoy J. in McGrath , concluding 
that the inaction on the part of the defendant in Quigley fell short of 
the standard of the reasonably prudent employer. 
In Maher v Jabil ,23 Clarke J. applied the 16 principles derived from 
the Hatton decision, accepting that the injury which the plaintiff 
sustained was directly attributable to the experience in the 
workplace. However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the 
grounds that the types of injuries sustained were not reasonably 
foreseeable. In reaching his decision, Clarke J. distinguished 
between circumstances in which a plaintiff suffered from ordinary 
occupational stress and circumstances in which a plaintiff sustained 
an injury to his health arising out of unacceptable practices.24 The 
court took the view that the targets which the employer had set for 
the plaintiff in Maher , though challenging, were not excessive; 
consequently, it was the court's belief that the defendants were not in 
breach of duty to the plaintiff. Of further interest, the court in obiter 
commented on the nature of the counselling services provided by 
employers (in line with the common law developments initiated by 
the Hatton decision), saying the mere existence of a counseling 
service itself would not exempt an employer from liability where 
such a service existed on paper but in reality did not provide such a 
service necessary to ensure compliance with an appropriate duty of 
care. 
Perhaps the most interesting case to come before the High Court 
since the McGrath decision25 is Berber v Dunnes Stores , where the 
plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendant had unlawfully 
repudiated his contract of employment and further sought damages 
for personal injury founded both in tort and contract.26 In considering 
the action brought under the headings of tort and contract, Laffoy J. 
expressly referred to the judgment of Coleman J. in the Walker case 
where it was held that the scope of the duty of care owed to an 
employee to take reasonable care to provide a safe system of work is 
co-extensive with the scope of the implied term as to the employee's 
safety in the contract of employment; a statement which was later 
approved by the Court of Appeal in the case of Gogay and 
Hertfordshire County Council .27 Laffoy J. accepted counsel for 
defendants submission that the starting point for consideration of the 
issue of liability should be the questions raised by Clarke J. in 
Maher ; namely, (a) has the plaintiff suffered an injury to his or her 
health as opposed to what might be described as ordinary 
occupational stress; (b) if so, is that injury attributable to the 
workplace; and (c) if so, was the harm suffered to the particular 
employee concerned reasonably foreseeable in all the circumstances. 
The process of bringing a claim under breach of contract was also 
considered in the recent decision of the High Court in Pickering v 
Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited ,28 where liability was 
imposed for breach of contract rather than breach of duty and 
negligence. The court established that the defendant breached an 
express term of the plaintiff's contract of employment by failing to 
address concerns which had been raised by the plaintiff. 
Consequently in the eyes of the court, the defendant's failure to 
honour its contractual obligations and its treatment of the plaintiff 
thereafter was a causative factor in the plaintiff's psychological 
injury. 
Having regard to the formula laid down by Hatton , Smyth J. 
established that Pickering had suffered a psychological injury to her 
health which went beyond ordinary occupational stress, and was 
directly attributed to both the defendant's breach of contract and 
breach of duty.29 The judge acknowledged that Microsoft was not 
aware of the harm from the offset and consequently it was not 
reasonably foreseeable; however, when the defendant became aware 
that the plaintiff was suffering from stress then a clear duty was 
owed.30 The court further noted that having heard evidence it would 
have been useful and good practice if the plaintiff had been 
contacted by a manager while on leave in an effort to resolve the 
situation. Consequently, the court awarded the plaintiff general 
damages of €60,000 for pain and suffering to date and €20,000 for 
future loss.31 
  
Dignity at work legislation 
Having considered bullying, stress and harassment claims under the 
headings above, and having noted the increasing overlap in cases 
which have come before the courts and tribunals, the question is 
whether legislation should be introduced to consolidate the law in 
this field. Bullying, stress and harassment at work claims are clearly 
on the rise. In the absence of one comprehensive statute covering 
this area, employers are forced to navigate a variety of different 
causes of action arising in different jurisdictions; clearly this is 
unsustainable and impractical. From a critical evaluation of the law, 
there is clearly a need for a statutory intervention which defines the 
parameters of this burgeoning area of law and which limits the 
jurisdictions in which actions may be brought.32 Certain countries 
such as Belgium, France, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden have 
already introduced specific legislation for dealing with workplace 
bullying.33 In terms of common law jurisdictions, few have embraced 
legislation to date, however there is movement towards placing 
clearly defined rules on the statute book.34 
The Expert Advisory Group on Workplace Bullying , in its most 
recent report, has recommended statutory intervention, offering a 
number of recommendations for dealing with the problem of 
workplace bullying35 : 
. 1.  Legislative force to be given to the requirement that bullying be 
a mandatory inclusion in all employers' Safety Statements and 
that appropriate policies and procedures be implemented in 
every workplace. 
. 2.  All employees, irrespective of employer or employment status, 
would fall within the remit of these recommendations. 
. 3.  All persons in the workforce, whether permanent employees or 
those operating under contracts of service, must be made 
subject to the policies and procedures of the employing 
organisation in respect of bullying. 
. 4.  The decisions of the Employment Appeals Tribunal or the 
Labour Court in cases of bullying would be binding and 
enforceable through the courts. 
The Advisory Group has proposed a model for dealing with 
bullying; however, the model suggested is laborious, time 
consuming and involves too many stages.36 Furthermore, it does not 
provide any guidance on how a defendant should deal with the 
perpetrator(s) of bullying once a successful claim has been brought 
before the Tribunal, or indeed the Labour Court. 
 
Developments in the UK 
Inevitably, because of proximity and the influence of UK decisions 
on Irish law, it is necessary to consider movements towards placing 
bullying, stress and harassment on a statutory footing in the UK. 
Indeed, there have been a number of attempts by Baroness Gibson to 
introduce dignity at work legislation before parliament, most 
recently in 2001. The Dignity at Work Bill 2001 which was passed 
by the House of Lords, (but not the House of Commons) makes for 
interesting reading and may serve as a template for the Oireachtas to 
consider in the future.37 The major provisions of the Bill are as 
follows: 
Right to dignity at work 
Section 1: 
. “1.-(1)  Every employee shall have a right to dignity at work and 
if the terms of the contract under which a person is employed 
do not include that right they shall be deemed to include it. 
. (2)  Subject to section 5 of this Act, an employer commits a breach 
of the right to dignity at work of an employee if that employee 
suffers during his employment with the employer harassment 
or bullying or any act, omission or conduct which causes him 
to be alarmed or distressed including but not limited to any of 
the following— 
. (a)  behaviour on more than one occasion which is 
offensive, abusive, malicious, insulting or 
intimidating; 
. (b)  unjustified criticism on more than one occasion; 
. (c)  punishment imposed without reasonable justification, 
or 
. (d)  changes in the duties or responsibilities of the employee 
to the employee's detriment without reasonable 
justification.” 
.  
Victimisation 
Section 2: 
. “2.-(1)  An employer commits a breach of the right to dignity at 
work of an employee if he treats that employee less favourably 
than he would treat other persons and does so by reason that 
the employee has – 
. (a)  brought proceedings under this Act against the employer 
or any other person; 
. (b)  given evidence or information in connection with 
proceedings brought by any person under this Act 
against the employer or any other person; 
. (c)  otherwise done anything under or by reference to this 
Act in relation to the employer or any other person; 
. (d)  alleged that the employer or any other person has 
committed an act which (whether or not the allegation so 
states) would give rise to a claim under this Act, or by 
reason that the employer knows or suspects that the 
employee has done or intends to do any of those 
things.” 
.  
The Bill provides for a more streamlined approach for dealing with 
bullying complaints. 
Complaint to an employment tribunal 
Section 4: 
. “4.-(1)  Without prejudice to his right to remedies for breach of 
contract for breach of the right to dignity at work, a complaint 
by an employee that another person has committed a breach of 
his right to dignity at work under this Act may be presented to 
an employment tribunal. 
. (2)  An employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under 
this section unless it is presented to the tribunal before the end 
of the period of three months beginning with the day on which 
the act complained of was done, unless in all the 
circumstances of the case the tribunal considers that it is just 
and equitable to do so. 
. (3)  For the purposes of this section any act extending over a 
period or any persistent or recurrent breach of section 1(2) 
shall be treated as done at the end of that period or at the date 
of the last such act.” 
Clearly this provision is markedly different from the recommended 
model put forward by the Expert Advisory Group, suggesting that 
the matter should go before the Labour Relations Commission 
(“LRC”) first, with the possibility of the case being referred to a 
Rights Commission and or the EAT / Labour Court later. The merit 
of such an approach is that it reduces lead time, making the whole 
process more user friendly and efficient for both employers and 
employees. 
The Bill also provides for a full defence to an employer under s.5 if, 
at the time of the act, or acts complained of, the employer has in 
force a Dignity at Work policy and has taken all steps to implement 
it, including appointing a competent person to assist the employer in 
undertaking the measures to comply with the requirements of this 
Bill and the Dignity at Work policy. Provision is given to the 
competent person to repudiate the act or acts complained of within 
three working days after he / she has been notified. Furthermore, 
positive steps are taken by the employer to remedy the loss. 
The Bill also provides the complainant with redress where a 
complaint has succeeded before a Tribunal: (a) an order may be 
made declaring the rights of the complainant; (b) an order requiring 
the respondent to pay to the complainant compensation assessed in 
like manner as any other claim in tort38 ; (c) a recommendation that 
the respondent take, within a specified period, action appearing to 
the tribunal to be practicable for the purpose of obviating or 
reducing the adverse effect of any breach of the right to dignity at 
work to which the complaint relates. 
Clearly a piece of legislation along the lines of the UK Dignity at 
Work Bill 2001 would be of great assistance in alleviating some of 
the problems facing employers and employees in the present climate. 
However, the Bill has its shortcomings and could be more 
comprehensive in relation to the provision dealing with Right to 
Dignity at Work under s.1. Curiously, the Bill makes provision for 
compensation assessed in a manner as any claim in tort. This may 
include an award for injuries to feelings, although the precise scope 
of the provision is vague and it remains unclear whether it would 
cover circumstances in which an employee suffers a stressed-
induced psychiatric injury. 
Ultimately the question that needs to be asked is whether it would be 
desirable to create an all-embracing statute dealing with bullying, 
stress and harassment in this jurisdiction. If legislation were passed 
to merely supplement the existing provisions then it would be a 
fruitless exercise. However, if the legislation has as its object or 
effect the consolidation, codification and amendment of existing 
provisions then it would be a useful instrument; as to how it would 
be achieved is another matter, and would inevitably require changes 
in jurisdiction.39 
 
Conclusions 
What is clear from an examination of the law dealing with bullying, 
stress and harassment is that there are too many causes of action 
dealt with in a myriad of jurisdictions. It would be wrong to 
conclude that the laws which presently exist for dealing with claims 
of bullying, stress and harassment amount to a code, as in reality the 
laws examined above are merely vehicles which have been used by 
litigants to seek redress in the absence of dedicated legislation. One 
longstanding solution would be to clarify, consolidate and codify 
existing employment rights legislation, much in the same way as 
taxation and company law have been consolidated in the past.40 By 
adopting the consolidation and codification model, some of the 
anomalies which exist under the present law could be addressed; for 
example, the dismissal provisions under the common law, the Unfair 
Dismissals Acts and the Equality Acts could be streamlined and 
broadened.41 Provision could also be made for circumstances where 
the employee has suffered an injury to his health arising out of work-
related stress, thus bringing together the law under the Safety, Health 
and Welfare at Work Act 2005 and the law of tort based on the 
courts interpretation of the Hatton principles. 
To achieve consolidation and codification however, would require a 
revolutionary change in jurisdiction, a discussion of which would 
require a separate article. From the author's perspective, the 
existence of parallel institutions such as the Rights Commission, the 
Employment Appeals Tribunal and the Equality Tribunal is 
unsatisfactory and untenable in the long run. One possible solution 
would be to restructure the existing jurisdictions to create a three-tier 
system to deal exclusively with employment rights law. The first tier 
would be a mediation-based service to deal with non-contentious 
issues; the second tier would involve creating a dedicated 
Employment Tribunal (amalgamating the EAT and Equality 
Tribunals) equipped to deal with contentious employment rights 
disputes, including equality claims with a jurisdiction limited to a 
defined monetary amount; and the third tier would involve the 
creation of a dedicated Employment Law Court as a division of 
either the Circuit Court or the High Court, equipped to provide 
equitable remedies and competent to deal with awards of 
compensation in excess of the Employment Tribunal.42 
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